CHAPTER II. —THE CHURCH
Section 1.—Scripture Narrative.

our review of Theological Discussions properly begins at the close of the apostolic age, yet there is one transaction recorded in the New Testament to which it may be proper to advert, from its intimate connection with the whole subsequent history and government of the church, and with the controversies to which they have given rise, many of them continuing down to the present day. I allude to what is commonly called the Council of Jerusalem, recorded in the fifteenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles.

There has been a very great deal of discussion about the true character of this transaction, and the lessons, if any, which it is fitted to suggest respecting the government of the church in subsequent ages. Papists, Prelates, and Presbyterians have usually held that it was fitted and intended to convey some instruction as to the way and manner in which the government of the church should be permanently conducted, and have all professed to find in it something to favor their respective systems’; while Congregationalists, not being able to find in it anything to favor their views of church government, have generally contented themselves with maintaining that it does not afford any—very clear or certain materials for determining in what way the government of the church should be conducted in subsequent ages.[1] Papists, finding it recorded here that Peter took a prominent part in the discussion which arose upon this occasion, adduce the that he acted then, was entitled narrative as a proof to act, and was recognized as entitled to act, as the vicar of Christ and the head of the church. Prelatists, finding that, several centuries afterwards, the notion was broached that James was appointed by the apostles Bishop of Jerusalem, profess to get scriptural evidence of this fancy in the prominent part which he took in the discussion. There is not in the narrative a trace of any superiority in office or jurisdiction on the part either of Peter or James; so that the substance of the Popish argument is virtually this, —Peter spoke first, and there­fore he was superior in authority and jurisdiction to the other apostles; while the Prelatic argument is, —James spoke last, and gave shape to the decision of the council, and therefore he was diocesan bishop, and, as such, superior in some respects even to the apostles. This, of course, is sheer trifling; and the only question of real importance or difficulty connected with this matter, lies between the Presbyterians and the Congregationalists or Inde­pendents:

The Congregationalists usually contend that this transaction was so peculiar and extraordinary as to afford no pattern or pre­cedent for the disposal of theological controversies, and the regu­lation of ecclesiastical affairs in subsequent ages, and in ordinary circumstances;[2] while Presbyterians deny this, and allege that it affords a warrant for the general substance of some of the lead­ing features of Presbyterian church government. The question whether or not the transaction was so peculiar and extraordinary as to afford no model or precedent for the subsequent government of the church, is virtually identical with this one, whether the apostles acted in this matter as inspired and infallible expounders of the will of God, or simply as the ordinary office-bearers of the church, using the ordinary means of ascertaining the divine will, and enjoying only the ordinary guidance and influences of His Spirit.

Presbyterians contend that there are plain indications in the New Testament that the apostles sometimes acted in the admini­stration of ecclesiastical affairs, not as inspired men directed by the infallible guidance of the Spirit which they enjoyed in declar­ing truth and in organizing the church, but simply as ordinary office-bearers in cooperation with other elders, and more especially that they acted in this capacity merely in this case; and Congre­gationalists, not absolutely denying, and yet not prepared to admit, that they never acted in the administration of ecclesiastical affairs without infallible guidance, strenuously contend that in this case they acted under the influence of immediate supernatural inspira­tion, which infallibly guided them to a right decision, and that therefore it affords no model or precedent for the church in future times.[3] It seems very manifest, from the whole scope and strain of the narrative, that the apostles did not act here as inspired and infallible men, but simply as ordinary ecclesiastical office‑bearers, in conjunction with the elders or ordinary pastors. Had it been the purpose of God to settle the controversy which arose about the necessity of circumcision by an inspired infallible decision, the apostles might have at once decided it without meeting, and without discussion of any kind; or any one of them might have done so in the exercise of his apostolic authority, and confirmed his decision by the 11 signs of an apostle:’ Paul .himself might have done so at Antioch, without the matter being brought up to Jerusalem at all. This was. not done; the matter was brought up to the church at Jerusalem. The apostles and elders assembled to deliberate upon it publicly in the presence of the people; and we are expressly told that much disputing tools place regarding it, when they were assembled to decide it. The apostles who took part in the discussion, in place of at once declaring authoritatively what was the mind and will of God regarding it, formally argued the question upon grounds derived at once from God’s providential dealings, and from statements contained in the Old Testament Scriptures. In this way, and by this process, they carried con­viction to the understandings of all who heard them, so that they concurred at length in an unanimous decision. Here everything plainly indicates, and seems to have been obviously intended to indicate, that inspiration was not in exercise, but that the matter was decided by means accessible to men in general under the ordinary guidance of the Spirit.

There is no evidence, indeed—and the Congregationalists found much on this consideration—that any of the apostles were, even at the first, of a different mind from that in which the whole assembly ultimately concurred, or that they had any disputing among themselves; but it is certain—and this is sufficient to warrant our conclusion—that there was much disputing, i.e., argu­ing on opposite sides, in the assembly in their presence; and that they did not put an end to this disputing by an immediate and infallible declaration of the mind of God upon the point, in the exercise of their apostolic authority, but by ordinary arguments derived from admitted principles, and addressed to the under­standings of those who heard them. The only thing that ap­pears to contradict the conclusion to which the whole scope and strain of the narrative obviously points, is the fact that the deci­sion to which the assembly ultimately came is announced in these words: “It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us:” Now, this statement certainly implies that they were confident that the decision was de facto in accordance with the mind of the Holy Ghost, but it does not necessarily imply more than this; and therefore it should not be held to imply more, as it would then contradict the general scope and strain of the narrative, which are plainly fitted to teach us that Christ, the Head of the church, determined the disposal of this matter, not by direct and infallible inspiration, but by a general meeting of apostles and elders seek­ing and attaining the truth upon the point, by means accessible to men in general with the ordinary influences of the Spirit. Not only does the expression, “it seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us,” not necessarily imply more than the certain accord­ance de facto between the decision given by them and the mind of the Spirit, but it seems of itself to indicate that there was something in the case different from a mere declaration of what they knew simply as inspired men. It seems much more natural, that if they had been simply declaring what they had been mira­culously and supernaturally taught upon the point by the Spirit, they would have said only, « it seemed good to the Holy Ghost;” the addition, “and to us,” having the appearance of intimating that they did not act in the matter merely and solely as the in­spired declarers of His mind, though confident that their decision was accordant with His.

We hold it, then, to be clear, that while the apostles ordi­narily had the gift of supernatural infallible inspiration in the discharge of their public duties, in declaring the truth and in organizing the church, yet on this occasion they did not, in point of fact, exercise this gift, but left it as it were in abeyance, and acted in the matter just as uninspired men might and could have done. Now, these two facts, taken in combination, not only prove that this transaction may afford a pattern and precedent for the proceedings of the church ordinarily in similar circumstances, but also warrant us to believe that it was expressly arranged in this way for that very purpose, and that therefore it is the church’s duty to apply it for the regulation of her conduct. We assume now, then, that the view generally taken by Congregationalists, as to this controversy having been decided by a supernatural exercise of infallible inspiration, is erroneous. We assume that the whole transaction must have been intended, and of course fitted, to con­vey instruction and direction to the church as to the management of its affairs; and we proceed to inquire what particular instruc­tions or directions it does convey.

ENDNOTES:

[1]  Books and references on the Council at Jerusalem: — Moshemii Institutiones Majores, p. 269. Commentarii, pp. 155, 169. Buddaeus, Ecclesia Apostolica, chap. 4. Buddaeus, Isagoge, Lib. 2., chap. 5., sect. 3., p. 741. Parker, De Politica  Ecclesiastics, Lib. In, chap. 13. Boehmeri Dissertationes Juris Ecclesiastici Antiqui; Diss. 3., pp. 98, 218, commented on by Mosheim, Inst. Maj. 264. —Rutherford, Peaceable Plea, chap. 14., p. 199. —Rutherford, Due Right of Presby­teries, pp. 355‑380, et seq. —Divine Right of Church Govern­ment. Jus Div. Reg. Eccles. By London Ministers, chap. 14 and 15. —Wood’s Answer to Lockyer, and books referred to there. Part ii., sec. 8., p. 302. —Cotton’s Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, chap. 6. and chap. 7., Prop. 4. —Gillespie’s Assertion of the Govern­ment of the Church of Scotland. —Brown’s Vindication of the Presby terian Form of Church Government; Lect. 8 and 12. —Carson’s Reply to do.; Lect. 10. —Davidson’s Ecclesiastical Polity of the New Testament; Lect. 7. —Wardlaw on Congregational Inde­pendency, chap. 6. —Heidegger, in his ‘Libertas Chris­tianorum a Lege Cibaria,’ gives a full commentary upon the whole chapter.

[2] Others besides Congregationalists have sanctioned this view. Dr Pusey contends that, “being the result of full inspiration, it forms no precedent at all.” —The Councils of the Church, chap. 1, p. 33.

[3] Wardlaw on Congregational In­dependency, p. 278. Davidson on the Ecclesiastical Polity of the New Testament; Lect. 8, p. 317.