CHAPTER VI. —THE FATHERS OF THE SECOND AND THIRD CENTURIES
Section 4.—Origen.

, the first of the Latin fathers, would come next in point of time; but it may be better, in the first place, to say a few words about Origen, the pupil of Clement, and his successor, as the head of the catechetical school of Alexandria. Origen occupied the first half of the third century; and though he was inferior to none of the fathers in talent and erudition, and rendered some very important services to the cause of Christian literature, yet we fear it must be said of him, that he extended and propagated the corruption both of doctrine and morality which Clement had done a good deal to promote, and thus exerted a most injurious influence upon the church. Origen was a most voluminous writer, and many of his works have come down to us; but there have been great controversies among learned men both as to their genuineness and their integrity. In regard to some of the works which have been ascribed to him, it is not easy to decide whether the evidence for or against their genuineness preponderates. Many of them have come down to us only in a Latin translation; and the translator Ruffinus has candidly informed us, that he altered many of Origen’s statements, in order to render them more intelligible and less objectionable. Hence it has happened that, both in ancient and modern times, there have been great controversies in the church as to the true opinions of Origen, and the extent of his deviations from the orthodox faith.

A lengthened controversy took place upon this subject be­tween Jerome and Ruffinus in the end of the fourth century, —Jerome attacking, and Ruffinus defending him; and in the course of the fifth and sixth centuries, the question whether Origen was a heretic was discussed in several councils, and the decisions were generally adverse to him. At last he was conclusively pronounced to be a heretic by the fifth general council held at Constantinople in the year 553.[1] The decision was unquestionably a right one, for there can be no reasonable doubt that Origen grievously per­verted some of the most important doctrines of the gospel. He was more deeply imbued with the principles of the eclectic or neo-Platonic philosophy than Clement, and applied it more boldly and unscrupulously than his instructor had ventured to do, in many daring speculations about God and the creation of the world, about angels and demons, and about the souls and destinies of men, —very much as if he had thrown off all regard to the authority of Scripture, and thought himself at full liberty to in­dulge without restraint in his own baseless speculations, even in regard to subjects which are plainly revealed to us. He believed in the eternity of matter, upon the ground that God could not have existed for any period of duration without putting forth the creative energy; thus setting a paltry piece of metaphysical speculation, upon a point of which man can know nothing except what God has been pleased to reveal, in opposition to the plain declarations of what he still professed to regard as the word of God. He believed in the preexistence of human souls, and taught that they were confined in human bodies as a punishment for sins committed in some previous condition; and he believed in the ultimate salvation of all God’s intelligent creatures, devils as well as men. He has spoken sometimes about the Trinity, and the person of Christ, in a way that has occasioned considerable difficulty to the defenders of the orthodoxy of the ante-Nicene fathers upon this point. Bishop Bull seems rather disposed to get rid of the necessity of investigating minutely the statements upon this subject contained in many of his other works, and thinks that his real opinion should be taken chiefly from his book against Celsus, because it was written when he was far advanced in life, —because it contains scarcely any of the extravagant and presumptuous speculations in which in his other works he so largely indulged, —and because it seems to have come down to us with a purer and more uncorrupted text than many of his other writings.[2] And in that very valuable work, —for such it undoubtedly is, —he very plainly asserts the divinity of Christ. It is certain, however, that Origen thought that the divine nature was united only with the soul, and not with the body of Christ; so that there was no proper hypostatical union, as it is commonly called, —no proper assumption by Christ of human nature. This groundless fancy led to his maintenance of what may be regarded as a still more serious and dangerous error, viz., a virtual denial that Christ offered any proper vicarious satisfaction to God, and thus made a real atonement for the sins of men. This, of course, overturns the Gospel of our salvation; and it is a melancholy instance of the extent to which an unwar­rantable indulgence in mere philosophical speculations may lead men astray from the path of scriptural truth.

There is, however, another department in Origen’s theology to which it may be more necessary to advert, not because it exhibits a more dangerous or deadly error, —for no error can be more dangerous or deadly than a denial of Christ’s vicarious atonement, but because Origen, while he received it in some measure from preceding writers, probably exerted more influence in diffusing it in the church than in propagating any of the other errors which he taught; and because it has enjoyed perhaps a wider diffusion in the church than any of them. We refer to what was afterwards called the Pelagian heresy. Jerome, who exerted himself so zealously and elaborately in the end of the fourth century to establish the heterodoxy of Origen in opposition to Ruffinus, has charged him with teaching the doctrines afterwards promulgated by Pelagius and his followers; and the charge, unlike some of Jerome’s furious invectives, seems to rest upon a sold foundation. Origen, indeed, cannot be said to have taught the Pelagian system in expansion or in detail, to have brought it out fully, and illustrated the relations or connections of its different arts; and it is not by any means certain that he would have subscribed to the doctrines of Pelagius, as it is not difficult to produce from his writings passages which have a more evangelical aspect, and are more accordant with the doctrines of grace. But it is certain that he has laid down principles which naturally, and by fair consequence, lead to the establishment of the Pelagian heresy, and consequently to the overthrow of the scheme of gospel grace; and that he has done so more explicitly than any preceding Christian writer. His doctrine of the preexistence of souls, condemned to dwell in human bodies as a punishment for sins com­mitted in a previous state, is inconsistent with any right scriptural apprehension of the doctrine of original sin; and erroneous and defective views of the doctrine of original sin form the basis and foundation of Pelagianism.[3] Besides, he has asserted the freedom of the human will, in the sense in which it has been commonly maintained by Pelagians, much more explicitly than Justin, Irenaeus, or even Clement; and his case is different from theirs with regard to this point, in this important particular, that he has made statements which enable us to see that what he has said about divine agency and divine grace, is not to be understood in such a sense as to favor what we believe to be the scriptural view upon this point, or as really implying more than Pelagians have commonly admitted. Pelagians can speak much and strongly about the universality and efficacy of God’s agency, and about our dependence upon Him; and thus, when anything takes place of is effected which is regarded as a subject of joy or thanksgiving, they may ascribe it to the grace, or favor, or kindness of God. But it turns out, upon a careful investigation, that Pelagians, at least the more gross and open heretics among them, mean by this agency and grace of God, even when applied to spiritual results, effected upon men and by men, —to the renovation of their natures and the growing holiness of their hearts and lives, —nothing dif­ferent in substance from what they understand by it when applied to the production of the ordinary events of Providence, by which the happiness of men is affected, or to the common actions of men produced by the ordinary operation of their faculties. They admit, of course, since they do not make a profession of atheism, that God’s agency is in some way interposed in regard to all the actions of men as His creatures; that men are dependent upon this agency in all their bodily actions, and in all their mental operations; and are to look to Him as their sustainer, governor, and benefactor. But then they usually admit, or at least they may be driven to admit, that they do not hold that there is any difference in kind between the agency and grace of God as mani­fested in the production of their ordinary actions, and as mani­fested in the production of those which are spiritually good. In short, —for this is not an occasion for entering into detail upon the subject, —they virtually refuse to make any distinction between the ordinary agency of God, viewed simply as the Creator and Governor of the world, in the production of all men’s actions, and that special and peculiar agency in the production of actions spiritually good, which is ascribed in Scripture more immediately to the agency of the third person of the Godhead, in bringing men to Christ, and in preparing them for heaven.

We do not say that, where this distinction is not openly denied, there is no Pelagianism, —for many Pelagians, or at least semi-Pelagians, as they have been called, have involved their representations upon this subject in considerable obscurity by subtle discussions, but we do say that there is undoubted and palpable Pelagianism wherever men give plain indications that this important distinction with respect to the divine agency in the production of men’s actions is denied or disregarded. And this is what we fear applies to the case of Origen, and warrants us in regarding him as one of the precursors and promoters of the Pelagian heresy; for in commenting upon the declaration of the apostle, that God worketh in us, both to will and to do, of His good pleasure, he very explicitly lays down the principle, that as we have from God the power of moving, and are sustained or upheld by Him in the exercise of it, but determine of ourselves to move in one direction or another, so we have from God the power of willing, and are upheld by Him in the exercise of it, but have from ourselves the power of willing good or of willing evil.[4]

It is not at all surprising, considering the daring and pre­sumptuous character of many of Origen’s speculations, and the Pelagian cast of his sentiments, that he should have expressed great doubts, at least concerning God’s omnipotence. Pelagian views, indeed, result from, or may be run up to, a virtual denial of the omnipotence and omniscience of God; and thus terminate in practically withdrawing from Him that glory and honour which He claims to Himself, and will not give to another.

ENDNOTES:

[1] Natalis Alexander, saec. 3, chap. 3, art. 12, § 3.

[2] Bull’s “Defensio Fidei Nicaenae,” saec. 2, chap. 9. For his general chapter of Origen, vide vol. 5, p. 355; and for general arguments in favor of his orthodoxy on this subject, pp. 355, et seq. Oxford, 1846.

[3] Vide Walchii Miscellanea Sacra, Lib. 1, Exercit. 7, Historia doctrinae de peccato orifinis, p. 178. Buddaeus, Insiti. Theol. Dog. Lib. 3, Chap. 2, § 35, p. 844.

[4] Natalis Alexander, saec. 3, Chap. 3, art. 12, § 2.